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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
T HE Covenant for a League of Nations has justly aroused an
immense amount of discussion in this country, since it un-
doubtedly presents to the American nation the most im-
portant of the many questions of foreign policy growing out of the
Great War. Most of this discussion has dealt with the matter
solely from the standpoint of policy or expediency, without noticing
the interesting constitutional questions involved. When the Cove-
nant has, on occasion, been considered from the constitutional point
of view, such corsideration has generally been merely incidental
and the writer's or speaker's views as to the desirability of sub-
scribing to the Covenant have too frequently a.ad perhaps uncon-
sciously colored his conclusions as to its constitutionality. In this
paper an attempt is made to discuss the constitutional issues in-
volved, but without expressing any opinion as to the advisability of
the United States becoming a member of the League.
Since the Covenant is a treaty or part of a treaty, the question
as to whether it is constitutional or not naturally depends upon the
answer to the further question as to whether it is within the com-
petence of the treaty-making body to bind the United States to such
an agreement. The first question of a constitutional nature which
has been raised in reference to the Covenant is- aimed at the method
which has been pursued in negotiating the treaty, rather than at the
provisions of the Covenant itself. It has been alleged that the
President failed to consult the Senate before laying before that
body the completed draft for its approval, and that the treaty has
therefore not been made with the advice of the Senate, as contem,
plated by the Constitution.' It is doubtless true that the Consti-
tution framers intended that there should be close co-operation be-
tween the President and the Senate during the course of the nego-
tiations, as the Senate was expected to be primarily an executive
council for the President. Since treaties become, however, when
proclaimed by the President, a part of the law of the land, the Sen-
ate has acted on the theory that, in advising and consenting to their
ratification, it is acting in its representative capacity, rather than as
an executive council.. It is true that President Washington con-
sulted the Senate in person in regard to a proposed treaty, but the
Senate insisted on referring the proposal to a committee for con-
sideration, where the President would not be present, and Wash-
%C. A. HEXEsHOFF BRTLpT, "TEX CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS;
WHICHr' 53 Axmzxc" LAw Rrvxzw. 527-53o.
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ington declared that this defeated every purpose of his coming
there.2  There have also been later instances where the President
has taken the Senate into his confidence during the course of nego-
tiations, but it is now well established that the President may or may
not do so, depending on his own views of expediency. The Senate
may, on this account, fail to act favorably on the treaty, but it might,
of course, take the same action, even if it had been consulted. The
Senate has no right to demand of the President information relating
to the negotiations connected with a pending treaty, and, when mak-
ing requests for such information, stipulates that it be furnished, "if
not incompatible with the public interests," which leaves full dis-
cretion in the hands of the President.
3 Failure of the President,
therefore, to consult the Senate or to furnish that body with in-
formation during negotiations in no way affects the validity of the
treaty if the Senate duly advises and consents to its ratification.
Another constitutional objection which has been made to the
method of negotiating the treaty for the League of Nations is that
it has been made a part of the treaty of peace, and the two parts have
been s,- "inextricably intertwined" that the Senate, in order to secure
peace, is practically forced to consent to the ratification of both parts,
regardless of its judgment as to whether it is expedient to subscribe
to that part dealing with the League. By adopting this method, the
President, it is alleged, comes into absolute control of the treaty-
making power, the Senate is coerced into consenting to ratification
against its will, its free judgment in the matter which the Constitu-
tion intended it to exercise is nullified, and the constitutional division
of power between the President and the Senate in t -eaty making is
effaced.4  It is true that the President can create conditions 
and
shape events in such manner as practically to deprive the Senate of
free judgment. But all this is involved in the President's power of
negotiation, just as the President, in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, may bring about conditions which practically compel Congress
to declare war. Similarly, Congress, on its side, may turn the tables
by attaching riders to appropriation bills, which the President may
be practically compelled to sign. or to allow to become a law, against
his better judgment. In none of these cases, however, does the prior
action of one branch of the government preclude the other from
'MACLAY'S TOURNAL. p. 131.
This, of course, is a different question from that as to 
what information the Presi-
dent should furnish the Senate when he submits to it the completed 
draft of the pro-
posed treaty.
4 Cf. D. J. HILL, "'PESENT PROBLEMCS IN FOREIGN POLICY," pp. 162-3.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
exercising complete legal freedom of action. This, therefore, is a
matter, not of law, but of politics.
It appears, then, that no constitutional objections arise in con-
nection with the process and manner of negotiating the treaty con-
taining the Covenant. The contention of unconstitutionality, there-
fore, if sustained, must be based upon an alleged conflict between
the Constitution and the provisions of the Covenant itself.
It is obvious that many of the provisions of the Covenant are
merely advisory in character and place upon the contractuaries
merely moral obligations, even in the international sense. On this
account no constitutional questions would arise in connection with
them, and, for the purposes of this paper, they may be omitted from
consideration. There are other provisions, however, about which,
on account of the limitations of human language if -fcr no other
reason, doubts may be entertained as to their meaning and inter-
pretation in reference to the character of the obligation incurred
under them. On this account disputes may arise between this coun-
try and other members of the League as to the interpretation of the
treaty. Provision is made in Articles XIII and XV. for the settle-
ment of disputes between members either by arbitration or by sub-
mission to the League Council, and disputes as to the interpretation
of a treaty are specifically mentioned as suitable for submission to
arbitration. On the other hand, our Constitution provides that the
judicial power vested in the courts of the United States shall extend
to all cases in law and equity arising under treaties made under their
authority, and, in exercising such power, it may become necessary
for the courts to interpret the meaning of treaties in applying their
provisions to cases brought before them. Have we here a conflict
between the Constitution and the Covenant? If so, then it was un-
constitutional for the United States to enter into the numerous
treaties in which we undertook-to submit, by special agreement, to
the permanent court of arbitration at The Hague international differ-
ences which might arise of a legal nature or relating to the inter-
pretation of treaties existing between the contractuaries.
5 Further
to answer this question, it should be borne in mind that a treaty of
the United States may be considered from two points of view, first,
as a part of the municipal law of the land, and, secondly, as an inter-
national contract. This is a distinction which is frequently over-
looked, but which is fundamental to any adequate consideration of
the question before us. The courts construe treaties as laws when
they are self-executory and private rights are involved, but they have
#See. a. 0.. 3.1 U. S. Stat. at L.. 1994-
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no jurisdiction to settle disputes between the contracting parties.
From the standpoint of contract, when an allegation of non-per-
formance gives rise to a dispute between the contractuaries as to
the interpretation of the contract, this is a political question and, not
being suitable for submission to the national courts of either party,
is reserved for settlement by arbitration or by submission to the
League Council.
Although treaties, under the Constitution, are a part of the su-
preme law of the land, and although that instrument declares that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases aris-
ing under treaties made under their authority, this is true only in so
far as such treaties are self-executory.
6 Where, through the treaty-
making power, a contract is entered into with the foreign govern-
ment to perform certain acts requiring supplementary legislation or
to refrain from performing certain acts, the enforcement of such a
stipulation is naturally dependent upon the action, non-action, or
limited action of the legislative department and no judicial question
is directly presented. Thus, as the Supreme Court declared in an
early case, a treaty "is to be regarded in courts of justice as equiva-
lent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself with-
out the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the
stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages to
perform a particular act-the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the court."
'7  Similarly, it
follows that where the treaty contains a contractual provision where-
by it is agreed that certain action shall or shall not be taken by the
executive department of our government, no judicial question is
directly presented, regardless as to whether such- action is, or is not,
taken by the executive.
If we examine the text of the Covenant, we find many such con-
tractual provisions in which it is agreed that future or supplemental
action shall be taken by the legislative or executive departments of
our government, and others where the government is bound not 
to
take certain action which it would otherwise be free to take. It 
is
believed, however, that there is no provision in the Covenant requir-
ing supplementary action by the legislative or executive departments
of our government which those departments would not be constitu-
tionally competent to perform even in the absence of a treaty; 
while,
moreover, it is well established that the power of Congress to 
pass
O Turner v. American Bapiss Union., Fed. Cas. No. 14,251.
Faster and Elam v. NeilSo, 2 Pet.. 314 (1829).
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legislation for the enforcement of treaties is broader than its ordi-
nary legislative power., Therefore, if such acts are passed, no case
could be made out against their constitutionality, while, on the other
hand, if such acts are not passed, such non-action on our part might
give rise to the accusation of bad faith by other nations, but no ques-
tion would arise in our courts.
It might be supposed that, due to the predominantly contractual
character of the Covenant, it would be difficult if not impossible to
bring its provisions before the courts for construction, since they
present political rather than judicial questions. But, even though
no citizen were allowed a standing in court for the purpose of suing
to enjoin the expenditure of public funds to pay the salaries of our
representatives in the organs of the League or our share of the
expenses of the Secretariat, it would be rash to affirm that no ques-
tion as to the constitutionality of the Covenant could arise in the
courts in a collateral, if not direct, proceeding. No case is known
where a treaty has been declared unconstitutional, though the courts
have refused to apply treaties when in conflict with later acts of
Congress, but the international obligation involved was not thereby
affected. It may be admitted that a treaty provision may be uncon-
stitutional, even though incapable of being so decided by the courts.
But, in such case, who is to judge unless it be the treaty-making-
body itself? And does not the action of that body in negotiating and
consenting to the ratification of the treaty obviously imply that, in
the opinion of such body, the treaty is constitutional? Moreover, it
is reasonable to assume that treaties are entitled to the same pre-
sumption in favor of their constitutionality as is accorded by the
courts to acts of Congress. In fact, this presumption is even stronger
in the case of treaties since the powers of Congress are enumerated,
while those of the treaty-making body are not enumerated but granted
in broad terms. In other words, it is not to be presumed that the
treaty-making body would undertake to make a treaty which is in
excess of its powers under the Constitution, and it is not, therefore,
to be presumed that a treaty is unconstitutional until so decided by
competent authority.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared it to be
clear that "the treaty power of the United States extends to all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the gov-
ernments of other nations." Although the treaty-making power
I Congress must have the power to pass the necessary legislation to enforce a valid
treaty, even though in the absence of such treaty Congress would have no such power,
for, otherwise, the treaty-making power would, in many cases, be rendered virtually
nugatory.
. 382
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does not extend so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids
or a change in the character of the government, or in that of one
of the states, it is not perceived, said the-court, that, with these ex-
ceptions, "there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted
touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation
with a foreign country." In the course of the development of the
relations between nations, a matter which was not formerly a proper
subject of international negotiation may become so with the progres-
sive increase in the intimacy of contact and intercourse betWeen
nations. Therefore, even if the Covenant were entirely unprece-
dented in all its features, it would not necessarily follow that the
treaty-making power is incompetent to deal with it. If, on the other
hand, it can be shown that precedents exist in previous international
agreements into which the United States hag entered for most of
the important provisions of the Covenant, the presumption in favor
of its constitutionality will be greatly strengthened.
In Article VI of the Covenant it is provided that the expenses
of the Secretariat shall be borne by the members of the League in
accordance with a designated rule of apportionment. It is obvious
that this provision implies that Congress shall make an appropriation
for its execution The Constitution provides that no money shall be
drawn from the treasury except in consequence of appropriations
made by law. Since treaties are declared by that instrument to be
laws, it might be supposed at first sight that money might be appro-
priated by treaty. But the Constitution also requires that all bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, and,
by custom, this special privilege of the House has been enlarged so
as to include also bills to appropriate money. Consequently, money
cannot be appropriated by the treaty-making body, but only by a law
enacted with the concurrence of both branches of the legislature.
Congress must therefore act in order that this provision of the treaty
may be carried into execution. But this is nothing new. As is well
known, there have been numerous treaties, from Jay's treaty down
to the present time, which have required for their enforcement the
appropriation of money by act of Congress. Although the House of
Representatives has asserted its right to exercise its own discretion
as to whether it shall make such appropriation, it is believed that it
has never refused to take the necessary action to provide means for
the enforcement of a treaty.
In Article X of the Covenant the contractuaries undertake to
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial
& De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S.. 267.
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integrity and existing political independence of all the members of
the League. It is further stipulated that, in case of any such aggres-
sion, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obliga-
tion shall be fulfilled. By Article XI any war or threat or war is de-
clared to be matter of concern to the whole League, and "the League
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe-
guard the peace of nations."- It has been alleged that, by these
articles, the Covenant attempts to transfer the power to declare war
from Congress to the Council of the League, in defiance of the Con-
stitution.'" But the action to be taken by the Council in case of war
or threat of war may reasonably be construed to mean no more than
the adoption of recommendaions to the contractuaries that war be
declared against any peace-breaking power. Further, under the cir-
cumstances mentioned in Article X, the Council might advise a
declaration of war, but since the nature of advice is such that it
need not be accepted, the members of the League would be under no
legal obligation, even in the international sense, to accept such ad-
vice. Since, however, the contractuaries undertake to preserve their
mutual independence and territorial integrity, they would be under
a legal obligation, in the international sense, to take such action as
would reasonably be conducive to the accomplishment of these ends.
By Article XVI it is provided that "should any member of the
League resort to war in disregard of its covenants * * * it shall ipso
facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other
members of the League." This provision, says Judge A. S. Van
Valkenburg, "contemplates that we may automatically be placed
in a state of war against some ,other nation without the action of
Congress, to which is confided (by the Constitution) tThe exclusive
power of determination."" This argument overlooks the fact that,
even from the standpoint of our municipal la*iv, the United States
may be placed in a state of war through the offensive warlike acts
of another power and without any action on the part of Congress.' 2
Article XVI merely recognizes the fact that the United States can
no longer remain indifferent to an invasion of the peace of the
world, even though we may not be immediately or directly attacked.
It is by no means unprecedented for the. treaty-making body to
bind the nation to go to war or to take warlike action under certain
circumstances. Thus, by the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, we
agreed with Great Britain to maintain a naval force on the coast of
2' See, e. q., C. A. HERES11OFF BARTLErT, toe. Cit., pp. 514-5.
21 Address repripted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, VO. 58, p. 146.
'* Ct. Prize Ca.vgs. 2 Black. 635.
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Africa for the suppression of the slave trade.' Under our treaty of
1846 with New Granada (Colombia) we guaranteed the "perfect
neutrality" of the Isthmus of Panama,"' and we entered into a similar
covenant with Great Britain respecting the Isthmian canal by the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty of i85o.' Through our treaty of i9o4 with
Panama, we undertook to guarantee and maintain the independence
of that republic, 6 and, at about the same time, we extended by im-
plication the same guarantee to Cuba.' 7 These treaty provisions do
not go so far as to require a declaration of war, but they almost
necessarily imply intervention or warlike measures on our part in
case the independence or neutrality guaranteed is threatened or in
imminent danger.
In Article XVI the members of the League also agree, under
certain circumstances, to sever trade relations with a member resort-
ing to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant. It is
urged that this provision infringes upon the well-established power
of Congress to place embargoes upon the export of goods to certain
countries. But many treaties have been entered into dealing with
embargoes or involving a modification of the revenue laws. Thus,
by our treaty of 1795 with Spain, it was agreed that "the subjects or
citizens of each of the contracting parties, their vessels or effects,
shall not be liable to any embargo or detention on the part of the
other.""' If such treaties are unconstitutional, then, in the language
of Calhoun, "its (the treaty-making power's) exercise has been one
continual series of habitual and uninterrupted infringements of the
Constitution."' 9 It may be true that the treaty-making body cannot
of itself repeal existing revenue acts, but there is no doubt of its
competence to bind the government, in an international sense, with
reference to the imposition of custom duties, even though Congres-
sional action may be necessary to carry out the agreement. If the
treaty-making power can provide against the imposition of em-
bargoes, there is no difference in principle in adopting by treaty an
agreement for establishing an embargo or international economic
boycott irr a certain contingency.
It has been argued that the necessity for Congressional legisla-
tion to execute the obligations of a treaty is an important limita-
13 W. M. MALLOY, TitFATzs, CONVzNTONS, zrc., p. 655.
"6 MALLOY. ap. CU.. .312.
Is Ibid, p. 661.
2' Ibid. . 1349-
IT Ibid. p. 364.
Is Ibid. p. x643.
itJ. B. MOORE, DIGEST ,F INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. V. p. t6a.
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tion upon the treaty-making power .2  This is a misconception which
arises from a failure to distinguish between the international and
constitutional aspects of treaties. Such an argument confuses the
question of the validity of a treaty with that of its execution. It is
too well established to admit of question that the powers of the
treaty-making body may overlap with those of Congress, operating
upon the same objects. The treaty-making power, if exercised with
reference to a matter which is properly the subject of negotiation
with a foreign country, can bind our government fully in an inter-
national sense, though the action of other departments of the gov-
ernment may still be necessary to execute the treaty. When by
treaty we bind ourselves to take some action which, under the Con-
stitution, can be taken only by Congress, it is no objection to say that,
in such case, the action of Congress is merely perfunctory, so that it
is deprived of its discretion to act in accordance with its own wishes
when the occasion arises. This may practically be true, for, in an
international sense, Congress may be placed under a moral or polit-
ical obligation to act in a certain way at a future time, but from the
constitutional point of view, Congress is still in possession of com-
plete legal freedom to act in accordance with its own discretion.
Congress cannot abrogate the international obligation incurred, but
it can constitutionally annul the treaty. Speaking of this distinction,
ex-President Taft declares that "the suggestion that, in order to carry
out such an obligation (to declare war) on the part of the United
States, it would be necessary to amend the Constitution, grows out
of a confusion of ideas and a failure to analyze the differences be-
tween the creation of an -bligation of the United States to do a
thing and the due, ordery, and constitutional course to be taken by it
in doing that which it has agreed to do."'"
Some of the provisions of the Covenant contemplate the creation
of an international obligation not to take certain action or to take
only limited action in reference to certain matters. Thus, by Article
VIII, after the adoption by the several governments of the plans
formulated by the Council for the reduction of armaments, they
agree not to exceed such limits without the concurrence of the
Council. By Article XII the contractuaries agree not to resort to
war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the
report of the Council, and by Article XV they agree not to go to
war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recom-
mendations of the Council's report. These provisions undertake to
o D. J. HLuL. "PRESENT PROBLEMS Z FOREIGN POLICY." ). z64.
ENFORCED PEACE, p. 67.
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place a limit, in an international sense, upon the full discretion of
Congress granted to it in the Constitution to declare war. raise and
support armies, and provide and maintain a navy. If, however, the
treaty-making power can bind the United States internationally to
take certain action requiring for its completion the consent and sup-
plementary action of other branches of the government, it is not
perceived that there.is any real difference in principle in exercising
the same power to bifid our government internationally not to take
certain action or to take only limited action in certain directions.
We have hitherto entered into treaties by which a limitation is at-
tempted to be placed upon the exercise by Congress of its power to
declare war. Thus, under the so-termed Bryan peace treaties, the
United States agreed with a number of powers not to go to war
with the other contracting party pending investigation of the dispute
by an international commission.?' Furthermore, by the Rush-Bagot
agreement between the United States and Great Britain in 1817, the
two powers undertook mutually to limit the extent of their naval
armaments on the Great Lakes.23 . Although this agreement was at
first a mere exchange of notes, it subsequently became a full-fledged
treaty through the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratifi-
cation. It is true, however, that it did not contemplate such a gen-
eral reduction or limitation of armaments as is provided by Article
VIII of the Covenant, but it did place a limit internationally upon
the power of Congress to provide for the construction o warships
upon a designated portion of our coastline.
Under Article XX, the contractuaries undertake that they will
not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms
of .the Covenant, and by Article XVIII, it is declared that no treaty
entered into hereafter by the members of the League shall be binding
unless registered with the secretariat. These provisions have been
attacked as placing an unconstitutional limitation upon, and delega-
tion of, the treaty-making power of the United States. But if, as
above pointed out, the treaty-making body can enter into engage-
ments which place limits, in an international sense, upon the powers
of Congress, no reason is perceived why, in the same sense, it may
not place limits upon itself. Article XVIII constitutes a conditional
self-limitation upon the binding force of international engagements
entered into by the treaty-making body, but places no constitutional
limitation upon the treaty-making power not already existing.
With reference to the matter of mandatories provided for in
: See. e. 7.. .8 U. S. Stat, at L.. z8.3.
MALLOY, 4p. cit. p. 629.
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Article XXII, two constitutional questions may be raised, first, as
to the power of the United States to act as a mandatory for any
backward country. This question is settled by the provision in-
serted in the revised draft of the Covenant leaving it to the volun-
tary action of each power as to whether iL shall undertake to act as
a mandatory or not. So that the constitutional question would arise,
not upon the adoption of the treaty containing the Covenant, but
upon a proposal subsequently made to this country to act as a man-
datory in any particular case. The second question is as to whether
the United States could constitutionally participate through member-
ship in the Council in defining the degree of authority to be exer-
cised by the mandatory power over the backward country. This,
however, would seem to be a lesser stretch of the treaty-making
power than the bringing of a foreign territory under the sovereignty
of the United States, which, it was established in the insular cases,
can be done through the exercise of such power. Nor would it seem
to be any greater stretch than was exerted in the treaty or general
act of 1889 between the United States, Great Britain, and Germany,
providing for the joint nomination by the three powers of a chief
justice of Samoa and a president of the municipal council of Apia,
defining their powers and making provision for the payment of their
salaries.2 4 The working of this agreement was unsatisfactory, but
that fact does not affect the constitutionality of entering into it.
Finally, the Covenant has been attacked, not because of any par-
ticular provisions, but because, taking it by and large, it establishes
a super-government over the contracting parties.2 5 To call the
League of Nations a super-government is a misuse of terms.
An organization which has no army of its own and no power of
securing funds by taxing individuals, but is dependent upon its con-
stituent members to supply these essential requisites of a real gov-
ernment, can hardly with propriety be called a super-government.
It is rather an agency of the constituent members for accomplish-
ing certain common purposes. The organs of the League are not so
much representative assemblies as they are congresses of ambassa-
dors of sovereign states. There is therefore no real analogy be-
tween the creation of the League of Nations and the formation of
the United States Government under the Constitution of 1787. That
government derived its authority from the people of the United
States and had within its own control all the powers of government
necessary for its maintenance and self-preservation, while the
21 MALLOY, nP. Cit.. p. 1576.
= D. T. HILL. OP. Cit.. P. 112.
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League of Nations has no dealings except with states and has no
powers except those granted to it by the contractuaries. Its effec-
tiveness will depend not so much upon the exercise of physical force
as upon the mutual respect of its members and their loyal and spon-
taneous support of the principles of the League.
J. M. MATHEWS.
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